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Abstract
Belief merging aims at defining the be-
liefs of a group from the beliefs of
each member of the group. It is re-
lated to more general notions of ag-
gregation from economy (social choice
theory). Two main subclasses of belief
merging operators exist: majority oper-
ators which are related to utilitarianism,
and arbitration operators which are re-
lated to egalitarianism. Though utilitar-
ian (majority) operators have been ex-
tensively studied so far, there is much
less work on egalitarian operators. In or-
der to fill the gap, we investigate pos-
sible translations in a belief merging
framework of some egalitarian proper-
ties and concepts coming from social
choice theory, such as Sen-Hammond eq-
uity, Pigou-Dalton property, median, and
Lorenz curves. We study how these prop-
erties interact with the standard rational-
ity conditions considered in belief merg-
ing. Among other results, we show that
the distance-based merging operators sat-
isfying Sen-Hammond equity are mainly
those for which leximax is used as the
aggregation function.
Introduction
The aim of belief merging is to define a coherent belief base
from a set of jointly incoherent belief bases, representing the
beliefs of a group of agents. The rationality properties of be-
lief merging operators have been studied in [Revesz, 1997;
Lin and Mendelzon, 1999; Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002a;
Konieczny, Lang, and Marquis, 2004; Everaere, Konieczny,
and Marquis, 2010b]. Especially, in [Konieczny and Pino
Pe´rez, 2002a], a number of postulates characterizing the so
called IC merging operators have been identified. At the
same time, many definitions of propositional belief merg-
ing operators have been pointed out. Most of these opera-
tors are distance-based ones, which means that they can be
defined using a distance between interpretations and an ag-
gregation function [Revesz, 1997; Lin and Mendelzon, 1999;
Konieczny, Lang, and Marquis, 2004; Everaere, Konieczny,
and Marquis, 2010a].
Two main subclasses of IC belief merging operators have
been defined in [Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002a]: majority
operators, which solve conflicts using majority, and arbitra-
tion operators, which try to find a consensual result. However,
while many distance-based majority merging operators have
been defined in the literature, very few arbitration operators
have been identified so far. To be more precise, the only ar-
bitration IC merging operators we are aware of are distance-
based operators using leximax as aggregation function.
Majority merging operators are closely related to the util-
itarian social welfare approaches, where the aim is to de-
termine solutions with the best aggregated utility [Harsanyi,
1955; Moulin, 1988; Sen, 2005]. On the other hand, arbi-
tration operators are related to the egalitarian social wel-
fare approaches, where the objective is to find solutions
which are as fair as possible; this usually means that they
give as much as possible to the poorest agents. To this ex-
tent, poverty measures [Rawls, 1971; Gini, 1921; Sen, 1973;
Dutta, 2002] are relevant to the design of egalitarian ap-
proaches.
The aim of this paper is to introduce and study new egali-
tarian operators, by exhibiting other fairness conditions than
arbitration and by pointing out belief merging operators sat-
isfying them. Our methodology to reach our goal consists
in investigating equity conditions considered in social choice
theory [Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura, 2002] in order to deter-
mine if they can be reasonably imported in the belief merg-
ing setting. Thus, in the following, we translate to the be-
lief merging framework two egalitarian conditions coming
from social choice theory: Sen-Hammond equity, and Pigou-
Dalton property. We show that the distance-based merging
operators satisfying Sen-Hammond equity are mainly those
for which leximax is used as the aggregation function. We
also introduce two new families of belief merging operators,
based respectively on the median and on an aggregated sum
(Lorenz curves). We identify the rationality properties satis-
fied by these operators and study in particular their egalitarian
behaviour.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we give
some preliminaries on propositional belief merging, focusing
on IC merging operators and distance-based operators. Then
we show how Sen-Hammond equity condition, and Pigou-
Dalton property can be expressed in the belief merging set-
ting. Since we want to define other egalitarian distance-based
merging operators than those based on leximax , some IC pos-
tulates must be relaxed; we define a general family of be-
lief merging operators, called pre-IC merging operators; they
are obtained by relaxing two IC postulates. On this ground,
we define the family of median distance-based merging op-
erators. We show that the operators of this family based on
the leximedk aggregation functions are pre-IC operators, and
those for which k ≥ 0.5 satisfy also the arbitration postu-
late (Arb), but not the Pigou/Dalton property. Finally we in-
troduce the family of cumulative sum distance-based merg-
ing operators; we identify in this family some pre-IC opera-
tors, and among them an operator satisfying the Pigou-Dalton
property. Some proofs are omitted for space reasons.
On Propositional Belief Merging
We consider a propositional language L defined from a finite
set of propositional variables P and the usual connectives.
An interpretation (or state of the world) ω is a total function
from P to {0, 1}. Ω is the set of all interpretations. An inter-
pretation is usually denoted by a bit vector whenever a strict
total order on P is specified. An interpretation ω is a model
of a formula φ ∈ L if and only if it makes it true in the usual
truth functional way. |= and ≡ denote logical entailment and
equivalence, respectively. [φ] denotes the set of models of a
formula φ, i.e., [φ] = {ω ∈ Ω | ω |= φ}.
A base K denotes the set of beliefs of an agent, it is a finite
set of propositional formulae, interpreted conjunctively (i.e.,
viewed as the conjunction of its elements).
A profile E denotes a group of n agents that are involved
in the merging process; formally E is given by a muti-set
{K1, . . . ,Kn} of bases.
∧
E denotes the conjunction of all
elements of E, and unionsq denotes the multi-set union. Two multi-
sets E = {K1, . . . ,Kn} and E′ = {K ′1, . . . ,K ′n} are equiv-
alent, noted E ≡ E′, iff there exists a permutation pi over
{1, . . . , n} s.t. for each i ∈ 1, . . . , n, we have Ki ≡ K ′pi(i).
An integrity constraint µ is a formula restricting the possi-
ble results of the merging process.
A merging operator4 is a function which associates with a
profile E and an integrity constraint µ a merged base4µ(E).
The logical properties given in [Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez,
2002a] for characterizing IC belief merging operators are:
Definition 1 A merging operator4 is an IC merging opera-
tor iff it satisfies the following properties:
(IC0) 4µ(E) |= µ
(IC1) If µ is consistent, then4µ(E) is consistent
(IC2) If
∧
E is consistent with µ, then4µ(E) ≡
∧
E ∧ µ
(IC3) If E1 ≡ E2 and µ1 ≡ µ2, then4µ1(E1) ≡ 4µ2(E2)
(IC4) If K1 |= µ and K2 |= µ, then4µ({K1,K2}) ∧K1 is
consistent if and only if 4µ({K1,K2}) ∧K2 is consis-
tent
(IC5) 4µ(E1) ∧4µ(E2) |= 4µ(E1 unionsq E2)
(IC6) If4µ(E1) ∧4µ(E2) is consistent,
then4µ(E1 unionsq E2) |= 4µ(E1) ∧4µ(E2)
(IC7) 4µ1(E) ∧ µ2 |= 4µ1∧µ2(E)
(IC8) If4µ1(E) ∧ µ2 is consistent,
then4µ1∧µ2(E) |= 4µ1(E)
See [Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002a] for explanations
on these properties. Two subclasses of IC merging operators
are also defined in [Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002a]:
Definition 2 An IC majority operator is an IC merging oper-
ator which satisfies the following majority property:
(Maj) ∃n 4µ (E1 unionsq E2 unionsq . . . unionsq E2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) |= 4µ(E2)
An IC arbitration operator is an IC merging operator which
satisfies the following arbitration property:1
(Arb) If
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
4µ1(K1) ≡ 4µ2(K2)4µ1↔¬µ2({K1,K2}) ≡ (µ1 ↔ ¬µ2)
µ1 6|= µ2
µ2 6|= µ1
then4µ1∨µ2({K1,K2}) ≡ 4µ1(K1)
Majority operators solve conflicts using majority. (Maj)
says that if one duplicates sufficiently many times a profile
E2, then the result of the merging of E1 with the E2 du-
plications will obey the choices of the profile E2. Arbitra-
tion operators try to find a consensual result. See the corre-
sponding condition 8 in Definition 3 and Example 1 which
illustrates how this property gives a preference to consensual
(“median”) choices of interpretations.
The representation theorems enable to interpret these log-
ical properties as constraints on the choice of interpretations
for defining the models of the resulting belief base:
Definition 3 A syncretic assignment is a function mapping
each profile E to a total pre-order ≤E2 over Ω such that for
any profiles E,E1, E2 and for any belief bases K,K ′ the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
1. If ω |= ∧E and ω′ |= ∧E, then ω 'E ω′
2. If ω |= ∧E and ω′ 6|= ∧E, then ω <E ω′
3. If E1 ≡ E2, then ≤E1=≤E2
4. ∀ω |= K ∃ω′ |= K ′ ω′ ≤{K,K′} ω
5. If ω ≤E1 ω′ and ω ≤E2 ω′, then ω ≤E1unionsqE2 ω′
6. If ω <E1 ω
′ and ω ≤E2 ω′, then ω <E1unionsqE2 ω′
A majority syncretic assignment is a syncretic assignment
which satisfies the following condition:
7. If ω <E2 ω
′, then ∃n ω <E1unionsqEn2 ω′
A fair syncretic assignment is a syncretic assignment which
satisfies the following condition:
8. If ω <K1 ω
′, ω <K2 ω
′′, and ω′ '{K1,K2} ω′′, then
ω <{K1,K2} ω
′
Proposition 1 ([Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002a]) A me-
rging operator 4 is an IC merging operator (resp. an IC
majority, an IC arbitration operator) iff there exists a syn-
cretic assignment (resp. a majority syncretic assignment, a
fair syncretic assignment) that maps each profile E to a total
pre-order ≤E over Ω such that [4µ(E)] = min([µ],≤E).
1When E = {K} we note4µ(K) instead of4µ({K}).
2For every pre-order ≤, < denotes its strict part and ' the cor-
responding indifference relation. Furthermore, we will use ≤K as a
short for ≤{K}, and ≤ω as a short for any ≤{Kω} where ω is the
unique model of Kω .
Let us now give some examples of IC merging opera-
tors using the familly of distance-based merging operators
[Konieczny, Lang, and Marquis, 2004]:
Definition 4 A distance3 between interpretations is a func-
tion d : Ω × Ω→ IR+ such that for any ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω:
• d(ω1, ω2) = d(ω2, ω1)
• d(ω1, ω2) = 0 iff ω1 = ω2
Usual distances considered in merging are the Hamming
distance dH : dH(ω1, ω2) is the number of propositional let-
ters on which the two interpretations differ (this corresponds
to the 1-norm distance, also referred to as the Manhattan dis-
tance) and the drastic distance dD, defined as dD(ω1, ω2) =
0 if ω1 = ω2, and = 1 otherwise (this corresponds to the
infinity-norm distance, also known as Chebyshev distance).
Definition 5 An aggregation function is a mapping4 f from
Rm to R, which satisfies:
• if xi ≥ x′i, then (non-decreasingness)
f(x1, ..., xi, ..., xm) ≥ f(x1, ..., x′i, ..., xm)
• f(x1, . . . , xm) = 0 if ∀i, xi = 0 (minimality)
• f(x) = x (identity)
• If σ is a permutation over {1, . . . ,m}, then
f(x1, . . . , xm) = f(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(m)) (symmetry)
Some additional properties can be considered for f , espe-
cially:
• if xi > x′i, then (strict non-decreasingness)
f(x1, ..., xi, ..., xm) > f(x1, ..., x
′
i, ..., xm)
Definition 6 Let d and f be respectively a distance between
interpretations and an aggregation function. The distance-
based merging operator 4d,f is defined by [4d,fµ (E)] =
min([µ],≤E), where the total pre-order ≤E on Ω is defined
in the following way (with E = {K1, . . . ,Kn}):
• ω ≤E ω′ iff d(ω,E) ≤ d(ω′, E)
• d(ω,E) = f(d(ω,K1), . . . , d(ω,Kn))
• d(ω,K) = minω′|=K d(ω, ω′)
For usual aggregation functions, whatever the chosen dis-
tance, the corresponding distance-based operators exhibit
good logical properties:
Proposition 2 ([Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002a]) For
any distance d:
• if f is the sum Σ, leximin5, or Σn (the sum of the nth
powers), then4d,f is an IC majority operator.
• if f is leximax , then4d,f is an IC arbitration operator.
3Formally, we work with pseudo-distances since triangular in-
equality is not required, but for the sake of simplicity we will abuse
words in this way.
4Strictly speaking, it is a family of mappings, one for each m.
5The leximin (resp. leximax) aggregation function selects the in-
terpretations that are minimal for the lexicographic order, once the
distances are sorted into the increasing (resp. decreasing) order.
Conditions for Egalitarian Merging
The only egalitarian property that has been proposed so far
for belief merging is the arbitration property, represented by
the (Arb) postulate (or the corresponding semantic condition
8 on syncretic assignments). So a key issue we would like to
address is to determine whether other egalitarian properties
are possible in the belief merging framework, and, if so, how
they relate with arbitration.
If one looks closely at condition 8 in Definition 3, it is clear
that the arbitration property only imposes some constraints on
the merging of profiles consisting of two belief bases. Then
the IC properties (IC5) and (IC6) ensure the propagation of
the constraints on profiles of any size.
We now propose a first alternative condition, coming from
social choice theory, for characterizing egalitarian behaviour
in belief merging. This condition, proposed by Hammond
in [Hammond, 1976] is known in the literature as the Sen-
Hammond equity condition [Sen, 1997; Suzumura, 1983].
This condition in this setting is expressed in the following
way:
Definition 7 (Sen97) If person i is worse off than person j
both in x and in y, and if i is better off himself in x than in y,
while j is better off in y than in x, and if furthermore all others
are just as well off in x as in y, then x is socially at least as
good as y.
It is translated in the belief merging setting as constraints on
the total pre-orders associated with the input profiles. These
constraints concern profiles of arbitrary size, and not only
those consisting of two bases. Before doing it, we first need
to define a notion of the respective “satisfaction” of two bases
given an interpretation:
Definition 8 Given a merging operator 4 defining an as-
signment which maps every profile E to a total pre-order ≤E
over Ω, given an interpretation ω, and two bases K1 and K2,
we say thatK1 is better thanK2 given ω, denotedK1 <ω K2,
iff ∃ω1 |= K1,∀ω2 |= K2, ω1 <ω ω2.
We can now give the translation of the Sen-Hammond Eq-
uity (SHe) condition:
Definition 9 (Condition (SHe)) Let E = {K1, . . . ,Kn}.
ω <K1 ω
′
ω′ <K2 ω∀i 6= 1, 2 ω 'Ki ω′
K1 <ω K2
K1 <ω′ K2
 =⇒ ω
′ ≤E ω
When distance-based merging operators are considered,
this condition is equivalent to:
Definition 10 (Condition (SHE))
d(ω,K1) < d(ω
′,K1) < d(ω′,K2) < d(ω,K2)
∀i 6= 1, 2 d(ω,Ki) = d(ω′,Ki)
}
=⇒
f(d(ω′,K1), d(ω′,K2), . . . , d(ω′,Kn)) ≤
f(d(ω,K1), d(ω,K2), . . . , d(ω,Kn))
Proposition 3 A distance-based merging operator ∆d,f sat-
isfies (SHE) if and only if it satisfies (SHe).
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
≤K1
ω3
ω2
ω1
≤K2
ω4
Figure 1: Egalitarian behaviour - (Arb)
Proof: (SHE) is exactly the translation of (SHe) when
the merging operator is defined from a distance and an ag-
gregation function. Indeed, in this case, K1 <ω K2 iff
∃ω1 |= K1,∀ω2 |= K2, ω1 <ω ω2. Then ∃ω1 |=
K1,∀ω2 |= K2, d(ω, ω1) < d(ω, ω2): ∃ω1 |= K1,
d(ω, ω1) < minω2|=K2d(ω, ω2) = d(ω,K2). Hence we have
d(ω,K1) < d(ω,K2).
ω <K1 ω
′ ⇔ d(ω,K1) < d(ω′,K1)
ω′ <K2 ω ⇔ d(ω′,K2) < d(ω,K2)∀i 6= 1, 2 ω 'Ki ω′ ⇔ ∀i 6= 1, 2 d(ω,Ki) = d(ω′,Ki)
K1 <ω K2 ⇔ d(ω,K1) < d(ω,K2)
K1 <ω′ K2 ⇔ d(ω′,K1) < d(ω′,K2)
Using transitivity, we get: d(ω,K1) < d(ω′,K1) <
d(ω′,K2) < d(ω,K2) and ∀i 6= 1, 2 ω 'Ki ω′ ⇔ ∀i 6=
1, 2 d(ω,Ki) = d(ω
′,Ki). Hence ω′ ≤E ω ⇔ f(d(ω′,K1),
d(ω′,K2), . . . , d(ω′,Kn)) ≤ f(d(ω,K1), d(ω,K2), . . . ,
d(ω,Kn)). 2
This Sen-Hammond Equity condition expresses the follow-
ing idea: compare two “situations” ω1 and ω2 that are equally
good for all the agents except two of them. For these two
agents one of them (K1) is in the two situations better than
the other agent (K2). Then the fairer situation is the one that
gives the more to the less satisfied agent (K2).
This condition looks close to the arbitration condition
(compare (SHe) with condition 8 of Definition 3), but the two
conditions are logically independent. Let us now illustrate on
a simple example how they differ:
Example 1 Consider a propositional language over two
variables and a distance-based merging operator4d,f . Sup-
pose that the distance d on which4d,f is built is the shortest
path distance on the following graph:
ω1
1 ω2
1 ω3
1 ω4.
Figure 1 illustrates the case when the unique model of K1
is ω1 and the unique model of K2 is ω3. It is clear here that
ω1 and ω3 play symmetrical roles, so that they cannot be dis-
tinguished when we merge K1 and K2. However, on this ex-
ample, ω2 appears as a more consensual choice than ω1 and
ω3 for this merging. Accordingly, (Arb) imposes that ω2 is
strictly preferred to ω1 and ω3 in ≤{K1,K2}.
Suppose now that we want to mergeE′ = {K ′1,K ′2} where
[K ′1]={ω1, ω3} and [K ′2] ={ω4}, and that the choice to be
made is between ω1 and ω2 (i.e., the integrity constraint µ sat-
isfies [µ] = {ω1, ω2}). This is illustrated by Figure 2. (Arb)
imposes no constraint on this choice. But clearly, whatever
the choice between {ω1}, {ω2}, or {ω1, ω2}, the result will
be closer to K ′1 than to K
′
2. So a simple equity argument is to
ω1 ω3
ω2 ω4
≤K′1
ω4
ω3
ω2
ω1
≤K′2
Figure 2: Egalitarian behaviour - (SHE)
commit to the choice that is the best for the farest base K ′2,
so to consider that ω2 is strictly preferred to ω1 in ≤E′ . This
is what (SHe) gives.
Unfortunately, the family of distance-based IC operators
satisfying condition (SHE) looks rather limited:
Proposition 4 Let d be any distance and f be any aggre-
gation function satisfying strict non-decreasingness. The IC
merging operator ∆d,f satisfies condition (SHE) if and only
if f = leximax .
Proof: We know that ∆d,leximax is an IC operator such that
leximax satisfies strict-decreasingness. It is easy to check
that ∆d,leximax satisfies (SHE), so we have mainly to prove
the converse implication.
Consider a distance d and an aggregation function f satisfy-
ing strict non-decreasingness, and suppose that ∆d,f satisfies
(SHE).
LetX = (x1, . . . , xn) andX ′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n) be two vectors
of distances to a profile E, ordered in the descending way
(∀i, xi = d(ω,Ki) and xi ≥ xi+1; x′i = d(ω′,Ki) and
x′i ≥ x′i+1). We have to show that:
X <leximax X
′ ⇔ f(X) < f(X ′) (1)
and
X 'leximax X ′6 ⇔ f(X) = f(X ′) (2)
We start with statement (1). Suppose that X <leximax X ′.
We know that ∃l s.t. ∀i < l, xi = x′i and xl < x′l.
Case 1: l = n or ∀i > l, xi = x′i: using strict non-
decreasingness we get f(X) < f(X ′).
Case 2: Suppose that ∃k > l, xk 6= x′k and ∀i 6= k, l, xi =
x′i.
• If xk ≤ x′k, then using strict-decreasingness (as
xl < x
′
l), we get f(X) < f(X
′).
• If xk > x′k, then we have x′l > xl ≥ xk > x′k.
Consider a vector Y = (y1, . . . , yn) s.t. ∀i 6= k, l,
yi = x
′
i and yk, yl such that x
′
l > yl > yk > xl. As
we have ∀i 6= k, l, yi = x′i and x′l > yl > yk > x′k,
because ∆d,f satisfies (SHE), we can conclude that
f(Y ) ≤ f(X ′). Furthermore ∀i 6= k, l, yi = xi and
yl > yk > xl ≥ xk, using strict decreasingness,
we get f(Y ) > f(X). By transitivity, we obtain
f(X) < f(X ′).
6If X 'leximax X ′, then ∀i, xi = x′i, so X=X’.
Case 3: Let us consider now the general case. ∀i < l, xi =
x′i, xl < x
′
l and l < n. We define n − l + 1 vectors
Y r = (yr1, . . . , y
r
n), for r = 0 to n− l:
yri =

xi if i < l
xl +
r
n−l (x
′
l − xl) if i = l
xi if l + 1 ≤ i ≤ n− r
x′i if n− r + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
We have Y 0 = X and Y n−l = X ′, and any two con-
secutive vectors Y r and Y r+1 differ only on two com-
ponents, namely yrl and y
r+1
l on the one hand, and y
r
n−r
and yr+1n−r on the other hand. Furthermore, Y
r <leximax
Y r+1, because ∀i < l, yri = yr+1i , ∀i ≤ l, yri ≥ yri+1,
∀i ≤ l, yr+1i ≥ yr+1i+1 and yrl < yr+1l . Using Case 2,
we can conclude that f(Y r) < f(Y r+1). By transitivity
we get f(Y 0) = f(X) < f(Y n−l) = f(X ′), and the
conclusion follows.
Suppose now that f(X) < f(X ′). If X 'leximax X ′, then
X = X ′ and f(X) = f(X ′): contradiction. If X >leximax
X ′, then taking advantage of the first part of the proof, we get
f(X) > f(X ′): contradiction. So X <leximax X ′.
Consider now statement (2).
If X 'leximax X ′, then X = X ′ and f(X) = f(X ′).
Suppose now f(X) = f(X ′). If X >leximax X ′, then
taking advantage of the first part of the proof, we get
f(X) > f(X ′): contradiction. If X <leximax X ′, then
taking advantage of the first part of the proof, we get
f(X) < f(X ′): contradiction. So X =leximax X ′. 2
Let us stress here that the condition of strict non-
decreasingness is quite natural and not very demanding. Ac-
tually all the aggregation functions giving rise to IC merging
operators we are aware of (including Σ, leximax , leximin ,
Σn, etc.) satisfy non-decreasingness.
Given this proposition, defining other egalitarian distance-
based merging operators requires to focus on other equity
principles, or to weaken some IC postulates. We explore both
ways in the following.
Thus, we first focus on another egalitarian condition from
the social choice literature, namely Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle [Dalton, 1920]. The idea underlying it is that ev-
ery transfer from the most satisfied agent to the least satisfied
one decreases the inequalities:
Definition 11 Let f be an aggregation function. f satis-
fies the Pigou-Dalton condition if for all vectors X =
(x1, . . . , xn) and X ′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n), if x1 < x
′
1 ≤ x′2 < x2
and x′1 − x1 = x2 − x′2 and ∀i 6= 1, 2, xi = x′i then
f(X) < f(X ′).
This principle states that if X ′ can be obtained from X by
just making some satisfaction transfer from a well-satisfied
agent to a less satisfied one, without changing the fact that
the first one is still more satisfied than the second one, then
X ′ is fairer than X .
This principle can be translated as follows for distance-
based merging:
Definition 12 (Condition (PD)) If ∃k and l s.t. d(ω,Kk) <
d(ω′,Kk) ≤ d(ω′,Kl) < d(ω,Kl) and d(ω′,Kk) −
d(ω,Kk) = d(ω,Kl) − d(ω′,Kl) and ∀i 6= k and i 6=
l, d(ω,Ki) = d(ω
′,Ki) then ω′ <E ω.
Of course not all distance-based IC operators satisfy the
(PD) condition. However, it is satisfied by the well-known
arbitration operators based on leximax :
Proposition 5 Let d be any distance.
• ∆d,leximax satisfies the (PD) condition.
• ∆d,Σ and ∆d,leximin do not satisfy the (PD) condition.
Pre-IC Operators
We now define a general family of belief merging operators,
called pre-IC merging operators, obtained by relaxing the two
postulates (IC5) and (IC6) into two natural conditions used
in other aggregation theories contexts.
Definition 13 A merging operator 4 is pre-IC merging op-
erator iff it satisfies (IC0) to (IC4), (IC7) to (IC8) and the
following properties:
(IC5b) 4µ(K1) ∧ 4µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ 4µ(Kn) |=
4µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn})
(IC6b) If4µ(K1)∧4µ(K2)∧ . . .∧4µ(Kn) is consistent,
then4µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}) |= 4µ(K1) ∧ 4µ(K2) ∧
. . . ∧4µ(Kn)
Thus, switching from IC operators to pre-IC ones simply
consists in replacing the postulates (IC5) and (IC6) postu-
lates by the weaker postulates (IC5b) and (IC6b). Indeed, it
is easy to prove that (IC5b) (resp. (IC6b)) is implied by (IC5)
(resp. (IC6)). As a consequence, we have:
Proposition 6 Every IC merging operator is a pre-IC merg-
ing operator.
Let us now present a representation theorem suited to the
pre-IC family:
Definition 14 A pre-syncretic assignment is a function map-
ping each profile E to a total pre-order ≤E over Ω such that
for any profilesE,E1,E2 and for any belief basesK,K ′, the
following conditions hold:
1. If ω |= E and ω′ |= E then ω ≡E ω′
2. If ω |= E and ω′ 6|= E then ω <E ω′
3. If E1 ≡ E2 then ≤E1=≤E2
4. ∀ω |= K, ∃ω′ |= K ′ ω′ ≤{K,K′} ω
5b. If ∀i ω ≤Ki ω′ then ω ≤{K1,...,Kn} ω′
6b. If ∀i ω ≤Ki ω′ and ∃k ω <Kk ω′
then ω <{K1,...,Kn} ω
′
Conditions 5b and 6b are direct translations of Pareto con-
ditions, which are usual conditions in social choice, multi-
criteria decision making, etc. So they should be considered
as minimal aggregation conditions to be satisfied. Conditions
5 and 6 (Definition 3) are much more demanding, since they
constraint all unions of two profiles.
Proposition 7 A merging operator ∆ is a pre-IC merging op-
erator iff there exists a pre-syncretic assignment that maps
each profile E to a total pre-order ≤E over Ω such that
[∆µ(E)] = min([µ],≤E).
Proof:
Only If Let ∆ be a pre-IC merging operator. We associate
with it a pre-syncretic assignment as follows: for any
profileE = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}, we define≤E by ω ≤E
ω′ if and only if ω |= ∆µ(E) where [µ] = {ω, ω′}.
From [Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002b], we know that
≤E is a pre-order; furthermore, as ∆ satisfies (IC0-IC4)
and (IC7-IC8), conditions 1 to 4 are satisfied by the as-
signment. We have then only to check conditions 5’ and
6’.
Suppose that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ω ≤Ki ω′. Then∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ω |= ∆{ω,ω′}(Ki). Let µ
such that [µ] = {ω, ω′}: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
ω |= ∆µ(Ki), so ω |= ∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧
. . .∆µ(Kn). From (IC5’), we know that ∆µ(K1) ∧
∆µ(K2) ∧ . . .∆µ(Kn) |= ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}),
so ω |= ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}). Therefore, ω |=
∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}): ω ≤E ω′, hence condition 5’
is satisfied.
Suppose that ∃k, ω <Kk ω′ and ∀i 6= k, ω ≤Ki ω′.
Then ω |= ∆µ(Kk), ω′ 6|= ∆µ(Kk) and
∀i 6= k, ω |= ∆µ(Ki). We have ω |= ∆µ(Kk),
ω 6|= ∆µ(Kk) and ∀i 6= k, ω |= ∆µ(Ki),
so ω |= ∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn)
and ω′ 6|= ∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn):
[∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn)] = {ω}. From
(IC6’), and as ∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn) is
consistent, we know that ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}) |=
∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn),
so {ω} = [∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn})] and
ω′ 6|= ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}). Therefore,
ω |= ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}) and ω′ 6|=
∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}): ω <E ω′: so condition
6’ is satisfied.
If Consider a pre-syncretic assignment mapping each belief
setE to a total pre-order≤E over interpretations. We de-
fine an operator ∆ as follows: [∆µ(E)] = min([µ],≤E
).
From [Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002b], we know that
∆ satisfies (IC0-IC4) and (IC7-IC8). Let us show that ∆
satisfies (IC5’-IC6’).
Suppose that ∆µ(K1) ∧∆µ(K2) ∧ . . .∆µ(Kn) is con-
sistent (if not, (IC5’-IC6’) is trivially satisfied).
Let ω |= ∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn).
So ∀ω′ |= µ, ω ≤Ki ω′. From 5’, we
know that ∀ω′ |= µ, ω ≤{K1,K2,...,Kn} ω′:
then ω |= ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}). We can con-
clude that ∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn) |=
∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}) and (IC5’) is satisfied.
To show (IC6’), suppose that ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn})
6|= ∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn). So ∃ω s.t.
ω |= ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}) and ω 6|= ∆µ(K1) ∧
∆µ(K2)∧ . . .∧∆µ(Kn). As ∆µ(K1)∧∆µ(K2)∧ . . .∧
∆µ(Kn) is consistent, there is an interpretation ω′ |=
∆µ(K1) ∧ ∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∆µ(Kn). So ∀i ω′ ≤Ki ω
and as ω 6|= ∆µ(K1)∧∆µ(K2)∧ . . .∧∆µ(Kn), ∃k s.t.
ω 6|= ∆µ(Kk): ω′ <Kk ω.
With condition 6’, we know that
ω′ <{K1,K2,...,Kn} ω: contradiction with the
fact that ω |= ∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}). Hence,
∆µ({K1,K2, . . . ,Kn}) |= ∆µ(K1) ∧∆µ(K2) ∧ . . . ∧
∆µ(Kn): (IC6’) is satisfied.
2
As one can expect, it is much easier to satisfy the pre-IC
merging conditions than IC merging ones. We can for in-
stance show that:
Proposition 8 If d is any distance and f is any aggregation
function satisfying strict non-decreasingness, then the merg-
ing operator ∆d,f is a pre-IC merging operator.
One can compare this result with a corresponding one
about distance-based IC merging operators, reported in
[Konieczny, Lang, and Marquis, 2004], and showing that the
aggregation function f has to satisfy two additional condi-
tions in order to guarantee that the distance-based merging
operators given by d and f are IC merging operators.
Median Operators
In this section we define a new family of merging opera-
tors using generalized median aggregation functions. Inter-
estingly, some operators of this family are pre-IC merging op-
erators and they satisfy (Arb). The idea of using the median
value is very motivated by trying to be as fair as possible. In-
stead of focusing on a unique aggregation function, we study
a full family of k-median aggregation functions, inspired by
the phantom voters voting rules of [Moulin, 1988].
Definition 15 Let k ∈]0, 1] be a real number, the k−median
medk({x1, . . . , xn}) of a multi-setX = {x1, . . . , xn} of val-
ues from a totally ordered set, is the value mk = xσ(dn∗ke) of
X , where σ is a permutation of X where the xi are sorted in
ascending order (d.e denotes the ceiling function).
For k = 0.5, the usual notion of median is retrieved.
In many cases these k−median functions medk are not dis-
criminative enough, just like min and max functions. So, we
can define k-leximedian operators, noted k -leximed , which
are to medk what leximin (resp. leximax ) is to min (resp.
max ).
Definition 16 Let L1 and L2 be two multi-sets consisting of
n elements from a totally ordered set:
L1 ≤kleximed L2 iff
• medk(L1) < medk(L2) or
• medk(L1) = medk(L2) and
L1 \ {medk(L1)} ≤kleximed L2 \ {medk(L2)}
Let us define successively the k-median merging operators,
and the k-leximedian ones:
Definition 17 Let E = {K1, ...,Kn} be a profile, d a dis-
tance between interpretations and k ∈]0, 1] a real num-
ber. Let dd,kmed(ω,E) = med
k(d(ω,K1), d(ω,K2), . . . ,
K1 K2 K3 distance vector med0.5
000 0 1 1 (0, 1, 1) 1
001 1 0 2 (0, 1, 2) 1
010 1 2 2 (1, 2, 2) 2
011 2 1 3 (1, 2, 3) 2
100 0 2 0 (0, 0, 2) 0
101 1 1 1 (1, 1, 1) 1
110 1 3 1 (1, 1, 3) 1
111 2 2 2 (2, 2, 2) 2
Table 1: Merging with ∆dH ,med
0.5
d(ω,Kn)). We define [∆d,med
k
µ (E)] by
[∆d,med
k
µ (E)] = {ω |= µ | dkmed(ω,E) is minimal}.
Here is an example illustrating the behaviour of k-median
operators:
Example 2 We consider a profile E of three bases such that
[K1] = {000, 100}, [K2] = {001} and [K3] = {100}. There
is no integrity constraint (µ = >), we use the Hamming dis-
tance dH and the value k = 0.5 for the “standard” median.
The computations are presented in Table 1.
We get [∆dH ,med
0.5
> (E)] = {100}. The only selected inter-
pretation is 100, because the best vector is (0, 0, 2), with a
median value of 0.
Some specific values of k lead to well-known merging op-
erators: given a profile E of n bases, ∆med

, with  ∈]0, 1n ]
corresponds to the min operator, and ∆med
α
, with α ∈
]n−1n , 1] to the max operator.
Let us now make precise the rationality postulates satisfied
by these operators:
Proposition 9 For any real number k ∈ ]0, 1] and any dis-
tance d, ∆d,med
k
satisfies (IC0), (IC1), (IC3), (IC4), (IC7),
(IC8) and (IC5b). (IC2), (IC5), (IC6), (IC6b), (Maj) and
(Arb) are not satisfied in general.
Proof: For space reasons, we provide only the less obvious
proofs.
(IC2) Suppose k = 0.5, d = dH and [K1] = {00},
[K2] = {00, 01} and [K3] = {00, 01}. We have
ddH ,0.5m (00, {K1, K2, K3}) = 0 and ddH ,0.5m (01, {K1,
K2, K3}) = 0: (IC2) is not satisfied. Note that for
k ∈]n−1n , 1] and any distance d, (IC2) is satisfied (the
aggregation function max is retrieved).
(IC4) SupposeK1 |= µ,K2 |= µ and ∆d,medkµ ({K1,K2})∧
K1 consistent. Let ω1 |= ∆d,medkµ ({K1, K2}) ∧ K1.
dd,km (ω1, {K1, K2}) = medk(d(ω1,K1), d(ω1,K2))
= medk(0, d(ω1,K2)) = med
k(0, d(ω1, ω2)), where
ω2 |= K2 s.t. d(ω1,K2) = d(ω1, ω2). Then
d(ω2,K1) ≤ d(ω1, ω2): dd,km (ω2, {K1,K2}) =
medk(d(ω2,K1), 0) ≤ dd,km (ω1, {K1, K2}). As a con-
sequence ω2 is selected.
(IC5) and (IC6) Suppose k = 0.5, and ω1 s.t.
dd,0.5m (ω1, E1) = med
0.5(0, 0) = 0, dd,0.5m (ω1, E2) =
med0.5(3, 4, 4) = 4 and accordingly dd,0.5m (ω1, E1 unionsq
E2) = med
0.5(0, 0, 3, 4, 4) = 3. Suppose ω2 s.t.
dd,0.5m (ω2, E1) = med
0.5(1, 1) = 1, dd,0.5m (ω2, E2) =
med0.5(2, 6, 7) = 6 and dd,0.5m (ω2, E1 unionsq E2) =
med0.5(1, 1, 2, 6, 7) = 2. Then with [µ] = {ω1, ω2},
[∆d,med
0.5
µ (E1)] = {ω1} and [∆d,med
0.5
µ (E2)] = {ω1}
(and then ∆d,med
0.5
µ (E1) and ∆
d,med0.5
µ (E2) are jointly
consistent), whereas [∆d,med
0.5
µ (E1unionsqE2)] = {ω2}. This
example shows that neither (IC5) nor (IC6) is satisfied.
(Arb) Suppose 0 < k < 0.5 (so that ∆d,med
k
is equivalent
to ∆d,min). The following example shows that (Arb)
is not satisfied. Let ω1, ω2, ω3 be three interpretations
s.t. d(ω1, ω3) = 1, d(ω1, ω2) = 1 and d(ω2, ω3) = 2.
The bases K1 and K2 are defined by K1 = {ω2} and
K2 = {ω3}; and the constraints µ1 and µ2 are de-
fined by µ1 = {ω1, ω3},µ2 = {ω1, ω2}. Then we have:
∆µ1(K1) ≡ ∆µ2(K2) ≡ {ω1}
∆µ1↔¬µ2({K1,K2})) ≡ µ1 ↔ ¬µ2 ≡ {ω2, ω3}
µ1 6|= µ2 and µ1 6|= µ2
}
but ∆µ1∨µ2({K1,K2})) ≡ {ω2, ω3} and ∆µ1(K1) ≡{ω1} : contradiction . 2
It turns out that k-median operators satisfy some but not
all the expected rationality properties. In particular one very
natural postulate (IC2), asking that the result of the merging
is just the conjunction of the bases when this conjunction is
consistent, is not satisfied (except for values of k making the
k-median identical to max ). We also have:
Proposition 10 If k ≥ 0.5, then ∆d,medk satisfies (Arb).
No other equity condition is satisfied by such operators:
Proposition 11 Whatever k, ∆d,med
k
does not satisfy (PD)
or (SHE).
Proof: Consider the following counter-example, for k <
0.5: medk(1, 3) = 1 and medk(2, 2) = 2: (1, 3) <medk
(2, 2): none of (PD) or (SHE) is satisfied.
Consider the following counter-example, for 0.5 ≤ k <
1: medk(0, 4, 4, 7) = 4 and medk(0, 4, 5, 6) = 5
(0, 4, 4, 7) <medk (0, 4, 5, 6): none of (PD) or (SHE) is sat-
isfied.
Consider the following counter-example, for k = 1:
medk(0, 4, 4, 7) = 7 and medk(0, 3, 4, 8) = 8
(0, 4, 4, 7) <medk (0, 3, 4, 8): none of (PD) or (SHE)
is satisfied. 2
Let us now turn to the k-leximedian operators, that satisfy
more expected properties:
Definition 18 Let E = {K1, ...,Kn} be a profile, µ an
integrity constraint, d a distance between interpretations
and k ∈]0, 1] a real number. Define dkleximed(ω,E) =
leximedk(d(ω,K1), d(ω,K2), . . . , d(ω,Kn)). Then
[∆d,leximed
k
µ (E)] = {ω |= µ | dleximedk(ω,E) is minimal7}
7w.r.t. the lexicographic order.
Again, some standard operators are recovered by consid-
ering specific values of k: ∆d,leximed
k
with k ∈]0, 1n [ corre-
sponds to the leximin operator ∆d,leximin , and ∆d,leximed
1
to the leximax operator ∆d,leximax .
As expected ∆d,leximed
k
operators satisfy more interesting
properties than ∆d,med
k
ones:
Proposition 12 For any distance d and any k ∈]0, 1],
∆d,leximed
k
is a pre-IC merging operator.
We do not have better than that. In particular, these opera-
tors are not IC merging ones in the general case:
Proposition 13 ∆d,leximed
k
does not satisfy any of (IC5),
(IC6), (Maj) and (Arb) in general.
Concerning egalitarian properties, we reach the arbitration
property, but not the other ones:
Proposition 14 If k ≥ 0.5, then ∆d,leximedk satisfies (Arb)
but does not satisfy (PD) or (SHE) in general.
It is easy to explain why the condition k ≥ 0.5 is needed.
Indeed, we know that when k goes towards 0 the leximedk
function goes towards leximin , and that when k goes towards
1 leximedk goes towards leximax . So it is natural to obtain an
egalitarian behaviour for values between “classical” median
(k=0.5) and leximax .
Considering Proposition 4, Proposition 14 shows that re-
laxing some IC postulates is a way for escaping from the
leximax -based operators while satisfying some egalitarian
condition.
Cumulative Sum Merging Operators
A very convenient representation of the inequalities of a dis-
tribution of income is the Lorenz curve [Lorenz, 1905]. The
principle is to focus on the poorest (least satisfied) agents, by
looking first as the utility of the poorest one, then at the sum of
the utilities of the two poorest ones, etc. To be more precise,
on a Lorenz curve, each element k of the x-axis corresponds
to the k poorest agents and the value associated with it on the
y-axis is the sum of the utilities of those agents.
This curve can be interpreted in different ways to measure
how much a distribution is fair. In particular, the fairest dis-
tribution is when for any n, the n% poorest agents own n%
of the income. The well-known Gini coefficient [Gini, 1921;
Sen, 1973; Dutta, 2002], one of the main inequality measures,
is the (double of the) area between the Lorenz curve and the
fairest distribution.
In the following, we adhere to the notion of cumulative sum
for defining a new family of merging operators. We translate
the distance between a base and an interpretation into a sat-
isfaction value by reversing the scale. Then we compute the
cumulative satisfaction vector and take advantage of an ag-
gregation function on it.
Let us define formally the cumulative sum merging opera-
tors:
Definition 19 Let d be a distance between interpretations, f
an aggregation function, E a profile and µ an integrity con-
straint. Let M = max ({d(ω, ω′) | ω, ω′ ∈ Ω}). For an inter-
pretation ω, we consider the vector (wσ(1), wσ(2), . . . , wσ(n))
K1 K2 K3 Cum. Sat. Σ
000 3 2 2 (2, 4, 7) 13
001 2 3 1 (1, 3, 6) 10
010 2 1 1 (1, 2, 4) 7
011 1 2 0 (0, 1, 3) 4
100 3 1 3 (1, 4, 7) 12
101 2 2 2 (2, 4, 6) 12
110 2 0 2 (0, 2, 4) 6
111 1 1 1 (1, 2, 3) 6
Table 2: Merging with ∆CS(dH ,Σ)
where wi = M − d(ω,Ki) is the satisfaction value of
agent i for the interpretation ω, and σ is the permutation
of {1, . . . , n} sorting the wi in ascending order (the less the
least satisfied). Then we define the vector of cumulated satis-
faction of µ, Wd(ω,E) = (W1,W2, . . . ,Wn), where Wi =
Σik=1wσ(k). Finally, the selected interpretations are the ones
which maximize the cumulated satisfaction Wd(ω,E):
[∆CS(d,f)µ (E)] = {ω |= µ | f(Wd(ω,E)) is maximal }.
Let us illustrate the behavior of a cumulative sum merging
operator on a simple example:
Example 3 We step back to Example 2. The computations
are presented in Table 2, in which the values represent satis-
faction values of the bases (the more the best), and not any-
more distances (the less the best).
We get [∆CS(dH ,Σ)> (E)] = {000}. The selected interpre-
tation is 000, because the sum of the cumulative satisfaction
vector gives the maximal value of 13.
We recover some existing operators as cumulative sum
ones:
Proposition 15 Let d be any distance.
• ∆CS(d,leximin) = ∆d,leximax
• ∆CS(d,leximax) = ∆d,leximin
Let us finally turn to the logical properties:
Proposition 16 If d is any distance, and f is an aggregation
function satisfying strict non-decreasingness, then ∆CS(d,f)
is a pre-IC merging operator.
• ∆CS(d,f) does not satisfy (Arb) and (Maj) in the gen-
eral case.
• ∆CS(d,f) does not satisfy (IC5) and (IC6) in the general
case.
While (Arb) is not satisfied in general, the Pigou-Dalton
condition is ensured for instance when any sum of the m-
powers, m varying, is used as aggregation function:
Proposition 17 For all integer m, ∆CS(d,Σ
m) satisfies (PD),
but (SHE) is not satisfied.
Proof:
∆CS(d,Σ
m) satifies Pigou-Dalton property.
Consider ω and ω′ s.t. ∃k and l s.t. d(ω,Kk) < d(ω′,Kk) ≤
d(ω′,Kl) < d(ω,Kl) and d(ω′,Kk) − d(ω,Kk) =
d(ω,Kl) − d(ω′,Kl) and ∀i 6= k and i 6= l, d(ω,Ki) =
d(ω′,Ki). We note g the value d(ω′,Kk)− d(ω,Kk), so we
have d(ω′,Kk) = d(ω,Kk) + g and d(ω′,Kl) = d(ω,Kl)−
g. g is strictly positive.
We note ∀i, xi = n − d(ω,Ki), x′k = n − d(ω′,Kk) and
x′l = n−d(ω′,Kl). We suppose that the xi are ordered in the
ascending way: x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn.
Let l′ and k′ be the relative ranks of x′l and x
′
k into the xi-th.
We suppose l′ 6= l and k′ 6= k. As xl > x′l ≥ x′k > xk, we
know that if l′ 6= l, l′ < l and if k′ 6= k, k′ > k. We have then
the following table, if k′ 6= k and l′ 6= l:
rank : w(ω,Ki) : w(ω
′,Ki) :
1 x1 x1
. . . . . . . . .
k − 1 xk−1 xk−1
k xk xk+1
k + 1 xk+1 xk+2
. . . . . . . . .
k′ − 1 xk′−1 xk′
k′ xk′ x′k = xk + g
k′ + 1 xk′+1 xk′+1
. . . . . . . . .
l′ − 1 xl′−1 xl′−1
l′ xl′ x′l = xl − g
l′ + 1 xl′+1 xl′
l − 1 xl−1 xl−2
l xl xl−1
l + 1 xl+1 xl+1
. . . . . . . . .
n xn xn
From rank 1 to rank k − 1, the xi-th are identical so the Wmi
also.
From rank k to rank k′ − 1, we have in Σm(Wd(ω,E)):
Σmk...(k′−1)(Wd(ω,E)) = (x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk)
m + . . .
+(x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk + . . . + xk′−1)
m
and in Σm(Wd(ω′, E)):
Σmk...(k′−1)(Wd(ω
′, E)) =
(x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk+1)
m + . . .
+(x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk+1 + . . . + x
′
k)
m (3)
In equation 3, the values from xk to xk′−1 are remplaced by
the values from xk+1 to xk′ . Since the xi-th are increasing,
we have Σmk...(k′−1)(Wd(ω,E)) ≤ Σmk...(k′−1)(Wd(ω′, E)).
From rank k′ to rank l′ − 1, we have in Σm(Wd(ω,E)):
Σmk′...(l′−1)(Wd(ω,E)) = (x1+. . .+xk−1+xk+. . .+xk′)
m+. . .
+(x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk + . . . + xl′−1)
m
and in Σm(Wd(ω′, E)):
Σmk′...(l′−1)(Wd(ω
′, E)) = (x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk+1 + . . .
+xk′−1 + x
′
k)
m + . . . + (x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk+1 + . . .
+x′k + xk′+1 + . . . + xl′−1)
m = (x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk+1 +
. . . + xk′−1 + xk + g)
m + . . . + (x1 + . . . + xk−1 + xk+1
+ . . . + xk + g + xk′+1 + . . . + xl′−1)
m
(because x′k = xk + g). Each term of Σ
m(Wd(ω
′, E)) is
equal to one term of Σm(Wd(ω,E)) plus g. As g > 0, we
have: Σmk′...(l′−1)(Wd(ω,E)) < Σ
m
k′...(l′−1)(Wd(ω
′, E)).
From rank l′ to rank l, we have in Σm(Wd(ω,E)):
Σml′...l(Wd(ω,E)) = (x1 + . . . + xk + xk+1 + . . . + xl′−1
+xl′)
m + . . . + (x1 + . . . + xl′−1 + xl′ + . . . + xl−1 + xl)
m
and in Σm(Wd(ω′, E)):
Σml′...l(Wd(ω
′, E)) = (x1 + . . . + xk + g + xk+1 + . . . + xl′−1
+x′l)
m + . . . + (x1 + . . . + xk + g + xk+1 + . . . + x
′
l + xl′ +
. . . + xl−2 + xl−1)
m = (x1 + . . . + xk + g + xk+1 + . . .
+xl′−1 + xl − g)m + . . . + (x1 + . . . + xk + g + xk+1 + . . .
+xl − g + xl′ + . . . + xl−1)m
because x′l = xl − g, so:
Σml′...l(Wd(ω
′, E)) = (x1 + . . . + xk + xk+1 + . . . + xl′−1
+xl)
m+ . . .+(x1 + . . .+xk+xk+1 + . . .+xl+xl′ . . .+xl−1)
m
In each term of Σml′...l(Wd(ω
′, E)), compared with
Σml′...l(Wd(ω,E)), one element xl′+i with i varying from
0 to l − l′ of the sum Wj is remplaced by xl. Since the
xi-th are increasing, xl′+i ≤ xl for 0 ≤ i ≤ l − l′, so
Σml′...l(Wd(ω,E)) ≤ Σml′...l(Wd(ω′, E)).
From rank l + 1 to rank n, we have in Σm(Wd(ω,E)):
Σm(l+1)...n(Wd(ω,E)) = (x1 + . . . + xl′−1 + xl′ + . . . + xl−1
+xl+1)
m + . . . + (x1 + . . . + xl′−1 + xl′ + . . .
+xl−1 + xl + xl+1 + . . . + xn)
m
and in Σm(Wd(ω′, E)):
Σm(l+1)...n(Wd(ω
′, E)) = (x1 + . . . + xk + xk+1 + . . . + xl′−1+
xl+1)
m+ . . .+(x1+ . . .+xk+xk+1+ . . .+x
′
l+xl′ + . . .+xn)
m
So Σm(l+1)...n(Wd(ω
′, E)) = Σm(l+1)...n(Wd(ω,E)).
Finally, we obtain Σm(Wd(ω,E)) < Σm(Wd(ω′, E)), for
all integer m, and ω′ is selected : Pigou-Dalton is satisfied.
For the other cases, when x′l (resp. x
′
k) has the same rank as
xl (resp. xk), there are less cases to be studied, the table is
simpler, but the result still holds.
2
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated alternative egalitarian con-
ditions to the arbitration postulate. Especially, we have trans-
lated to the belief merging framework two egalitarian condi-
tions: Sen-Hammond equity, and Pigou-Dalton property.
We have shown that the distance-based merging operators
satisfying Sen-Hammond equity are mainly those for which
leximax is the aggregation function. This led us to introduce
a new family of belief merging operators, the pre-IC opera-
tors, which includes the family of IC merging operators as
a specific case. We have pointed out a representation theo-
rem for this family, which allows us to define easily some
distance-based pre-IC operators. In order to enrich the fam-
ily of egalitarian merging operators, we have considered two
new families of belief merging operators, based respectively
on the median and on an aggregated sum (Lorenz curves). We
have shown that the operators based on the leximedk aggre-
gation functions (with k ≥ 0.5 ) are pre-IC operators which
satisfy the arbitration postulate (Arb). We have also proved
that the ∆CS(d,Σ
n) operators from the cumulative sum fam-
ily are pre-IC operators satisfying (PD).
Besides theory-oriented results, this work produced two in-
teresting families of egalitarian operators: cumulative sums
ones and leximedk ones. Before this work the only known
egalitarian merging operators were the leximax -based ones.
Egalitarian operators are significant for all applications where
consensual results are expected, i.e., all agents are sup-
posed to be satisfied in the best way, contrariwise to utilitar-
ian/majority operators. Whereas utilitarian operators can be
used when the information sources are sensors or databases,
egalitarian operators are particularly important in applica-
tions where such sources are agents which are autonomous
enough to reject the result of the merging if they consider that
it is too far from their position.
As already discussed in previous merging papers, usual
IC merging operators can be used to merge either beliefs or
goals. This distinction between belief and goals do not seem
to impact any of the usual IC postulates. It is straighforward to
consider egalitarian merging operators when merging goals,
if one tries to achieve a “fair” result. As to the belief merg-
ing issue, when the aim is to find the correct state of the
world, majority methods can appear more appealing. In [Ev-
eraere, Konieczny, and Marquis, 2010b] we discussed this
truth-tracking problem for merging, and we made a distinc-
tion between two possible uses of belief merging. The one
relating to truth-tracking is called the epistemic view, and
in this case it is natural to consider only majority operators
(this is a consequence of Condorcet Jury Theorem [Everaere,
Konieczny, and Marquis, 2010b]). But there is a second pos-
sible use, called the synthesis view, where the aim is to best
represents the opinion of the group (profile). This view has
nothing to do with the correct state of the world, the merg-
ing process only cares about individual opinions. In this case
egalitarian operators are appealing, since they provide in a
sense a more robust (i.e. more consensual) view of the opin-
ion of the group than majority operators.
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